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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is suit brought by the widow and five children of
Gordon Switzer, pursuant to Section 78-11-7, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), for the wrongful death of Gordon
Switzer.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Appellants' statement as to the disposition in the
lower court is correct.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondent seeks to have the judgment entered by the
lower court against the Appellants sustained.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondent agrees with the Appellants' Statement of
Facts, with the exception of the Appellants' statement that
Jack Thompson saw the incident clearly and concluded that
Gordon Switzer appeared to have no problem with the machine.
In addition to the facts set forth in the Appellants'
Statement of Facts, the Court should be aware of the following
dates:
1.

Birth dates of the Switzer children:
A.
B.

c.

D.
E.

2.

Connie Lou Switzer
Raymond Gordon Switzer
Donald Eugene Switzer
Rodney Dean Switzer
Therease Jo Switzer

October
October
January
October
May 22,

25, 1956
25, 1957
26, 1959
29, 1960
1963

Date of sale of the 175A front end loader by Clark:

August 25, 1956.
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3.
Switzer:

4.
action:

Date of the accident resulting in the death of Gordon
June 24, 1963.
Date on which Appellants filed the Complaint in this
October 23, 1974.
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POINT I
THE BURDEN WAS ON THE APPELLANTS, IN OPPOSITION TO THE
RESPONDENT REYNOLDS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, TO
SET FORTH SPECIFIC FACTS ESTABLISHING A GENUINE ISSUE OF
MATERIAL FACT AND FAILURE SO TO DO MADE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PROPER.
A.

The Appellants were required by Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure to establish a genuine issue of material fact.
The procedure to be followed by a party adverse to a
Motion for Summary Judgment clearly is set forth in Rule
56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

That subdivision

provides in its entirety:
Supporting and opposing affidavit shall be made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is
made and supported, as provided in this Rule, an
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of his pleading, but his response by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Rule must
set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond,
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered
against him.
Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (emphasis added).
It has been the Respondents' contention throughout the
proceedings in the lower court that the Appellants have no
facts which support their allegations of negligence on the
part of the Respondents.

The Appellants have an abundence of
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conclusions, but a dearth of facts supporting those conslusions.

It was due to this scarcity of supporting facts that

the Appellants were unable to meet the requirement of Subdivision (e) of Rule 56.

That subdivision requires that a party

opposing a motion for summary judgment establish specific
facts showing a genuine issue for trial.

The Appellants were

required to establish those specific facts by affidavits, made
upon personal knowledge, setting forth facts admissible in
evidence.
As the record discloses, the Respondent Reynolds' Motion
for Summary Judgment was supported by the Affidavits of Bryce
Reynolds and Richard Reynolds.

Those Affidavits were made

upon personal knowledge and contain evidence admissible at
trial.

That evidence established that the 175A tractor was

not defective and that the Respondent Reynolds was not
negligent.

The Appellants did not submit any affidavit

whatsoever to contradict those submitted by the Respondent
Reynolds nor did the Appellants, in their Memorandum in
Opposition to Reynolds' Motion for Summary Judgment and the
September 4, 1977, Memorandum referred to therein, cite any
"depositions, answers to interrrogatories, or further affidavits," as provided by Subdivision (e).

The Appellants'

Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent Reynolds' Motion for
Summary Judgment contains nothing other than the Appellants'
conclusions regarding the negligence of Reynolds and defects
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
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in the 175A tractor.

The Appellants completely failed to meet

the burden placed upon them by Subdivision (e) of Rule 56.
Now, on appeal, they wish, again, to ignore facts and argue
conclusions.

In no portion of Rule 56, the rule governing

summary judgment actions, does it provide that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment may rely upon his conclusion
as to the issues at hand.

The purpose of the motion is to

force a party to document facts which support his conclusion
and his cause of action.

When placed to this task, if a party

connot document the supporting facts, then there is no need to
take the matter to trial.

When the Appellants were placed to

this task, they responded with self-serving conclusions.
These conclusions, like any theory, are worthless without
supporting foundation.
The lower court, when reviewing the memoranda and
supporting documents placed before it by the Respondent
Reynolds, and those filed by the Appellants, made the same
determination.

The Respondent Reynolds could document that

it was not negligent and that the 175A tractor was not
defective.

His documentation met the criteria of Subdivision

(e) of Rule 56.

The Appellants responded with no facts which

contradicted the testimony supplied in the Respondent Reynolds'
affidavits, thus leaving the court with no alternative but to
grant summary judgment in the Respondent Reynolds' favor.

The

court was bound by the provisions of Subdivision (e) which
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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required that "If he [the opposing party] does not so respond,
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against
him."

Rule 56, Subdivision (e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
In addition to the direction given by Subdivision (e),

the court was compelled, in an equitable manner, to enter
summary judgment against the Appellants.,

The Respondents

were being required to defend an action filed eleven years
after the cause of action accrued.

After commencing this

action, the Appellants undertook extensive discovery of both
Respondents, and, in the case of Clark, submitted, in the
form of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents, 1,845 questions and 497 requests for production of
documents.

In response to this discovery Clark provided

the Appellants with all the documents it had concerning the
design and manufacture of the 175A tractor and attempted, to
the best of its ability, to answer the 1,845 questions
to it.

direct~

It was not until this discovery was completed that the

Respondents brought the motions now being reviewed by this
Court.

The Appellants had ample time within which to document

specific facts upon which they would rely in establishing
their causes of action.

If such facts had existed, the

Appellants would have found them.

Instead, when the Respon-

dents brought their Motions, the Appellants were unable to
document these facts, as required by Subdivision (e) of Rule
56 and thereby failed in their opposition to the Motions.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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CONCLUSION
The provisions of Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Proceaure, are clear.

The Appellants did not meet their burden of

establishing, upon personal knowledge and in a form admissible
at trial, the facts which would indicate a genuine issue of
material fact existing in this matter.

The lower court

properly ruled that Reynolds is entitled to summary judgment
on the issues of its alleged negligence and the alleged
defective condition of the 175A tractor.
POINT II
THE APPELLANTS ARE BARRED FROM ASSERTING
THE RESPONDENTS' FAILURE TO PLEAD THE
SPECIFIC SECTION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BY THE APPELLANTS' FAILURE TO RAISE
THIS ISSUE IN THE LOWER COURT
A.

The Appellants' Failure to Raise in the Trial Court

the Issue of Improper Pleading Prohibits Them from Raising It
on Appeal. The Appellants take this appeal from the lower
court's Order granting Reynolds' Motion for Summary Judgment
and Clark's Motion for Dismissal.

Both Respondents, in

support of their respective Motions, filed supporting memoranda, in which they argued the effect of Section 78-12-28(2},
Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended}.

The Appellants, in

opposition to these two Motions, filed two memoranda, in which
they argued that the statute of limitations was not a bar.

In

neither of the two memoranda filed by the Appellants was the
Respondents' failure to plead the specific statute ever
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,-5administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

raised.

Nor was this issue raised through any other pleading

or motion placed before the lower court.

The first time that

the Respondents were confronted with Rule 9(h) was upon
receipt of the Appellants' Brief.
The Appellants failure to raise, before the lower court,
the issue of the Respondents' defective pleadings constitutes
a waiver of that defense.

Utah cases are clear on this point.

In the case of Attorney General of Utah v. Pomerow, 93 Utah 426,
73 P.2d 1277, 1300 (1937) the Utah Supreme Court, when reviewing the Respondent's failure to plead, by section and subdivision number, the specific statute of limitation upon which he
was relying, held that:
The Appellant's next contention is that
the statutes were not pleaded as required
by law because the specific subsection of
Section 104-2-26 was not set out, as
required by Section 104-13-7. This
question was raised for the first time in
this Court. The motion to strike the
amendment or to reply to the amendment did
not mention it. We shall not, therefore,
now consider it, except to say that the
only part of Section 104-2-26 which could
apply to the allegations of the Complaint
is Subsection (1). No one could have been
mislead as to what part of Section 104-2-26
the Respondents' relied upon.
Attorney General of Utah v. Pomerow, 73 P.2d at 1300.
The Appellants did not raise the defense of failure
to correctly plead the statute of limitations until reaching
this Court, nor were they mislead by the Respondents' failure
to plead the specific section.

The Appellants, in their
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Brief, acknowledge that:

"If any statute of limitation

applies, it would be Section 78-12-28, Utah Code Annotated
(1953, as amended)."

Appellants' Brief

at 9.

With this

admission, the Appellants have disspelled any doubt that may
have lingered concerning whether or not they were mislead or
prejudiced by the Respondents' failure to plead the specific
section and subdivision.

See also Dean Vincent, Inc. v.

Chamberlain , 264 Or. 187, 504 P.2d 722, 724 (1972).

a. Application of the Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel or
Estoppel in Pais.
The Appellants, in their argument for the application of
the doctrine of equitable estoppel, attempt to create a novel
extension of that doctrine.

With the veil removed, the

Appellants' theory is that if an opponent in a lawsuit fails
to prove any defense he may have as quickly as possible, he
may be estopped to prove that defense at any later time.

In

support of this theory, the Appellants cite three Utah cases
which apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel in its more
traditional role.

In each one of three cases cited:

Whitaker

v. Salt Lake City Corp., 522 P.2d 1252, 1253 (Utah 1974); Rice
v. Granite School District, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159,
162-63 (1969); and Weir v. Bauer, 75 Utah 498, 286 P. 936, 946
(1930), the party sought to be estopped made representations
upon which the Appellant relied in delaying the institution of
suit upon his cause of action.

In both Whitaker and Rice,
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governmental officials represented to the Appellants that a
settlement would be effected in the near future.

Those

Appellants, in reliance upon the representations of the
officials, delayed giving the notices required under the
Governmental Immunity Act and failed to file their Complaints
within the statute of limitations provided by that act.

This

Court held that, as a result of representations made to the
Appellants by the officials, the officials would be estopped
from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense.
In Weir, a stockholder relied upon representations made
by a corporation regarding payment by the corporation to the
stockholder on debts owed to the stockholder.

As a result of

these representations, the stockholder did not initiate action
on the overdue debts and the statute of limitations ran.

Wh~

the stockholder commenced suit, the corporation raised the
statute of limitations as a defense and this Court held, in
that situation, that the corporation be estopped to assert
that defense.
In the present matter, the Appellants can point to no
representations made by either Respondents concerning whether
or not the Respondents would assert the statute of limitations, nor did the Respondents act to delay the filing of
Appellants' Complaint.

The cases cited by the Appellants do

not support their argument.
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The Appellants' argument for equitable estoppel must
fail.

This Court continuously has held that an essential

element of the doctrine of equitable estoppel is that of
misrepresentation or concealment.
Utah 559, 260 P.2d 570 (1953).

See Rabarino v. Price, 123

The Appellants cannot

point to any representations made by the Respondents to the
effect that they would not act upon their affirmative defense
of the statute of limitations.

Such an inability on the part

of the Appellants is fatal to their argument.

c.

Conclusion.
The Appellants have waived, by their failure to raise the

issue in the lower court, their right to use the Respondents' defective pleadings.

The argument for the application

of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, though novel, overlooks an essential element of that doctrine and, therefore, must fail.
POINT III
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PROVIDED IN
SECTION 78-12-28(2), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
(1953, AS AMENDED) WILL RUN SO LONG AS A
MEMBER OF THE CLASS ENTITLED TO SUE IS
UNDER NO DISABILITY AND FAILS TO SUE
WITHIN A TWO-YEAR PERIOD.
The Respondent Clark's argument on this point, simply stated
is:

whenever a class of persons is entitled to sue on one

cause of action and any one person in that class has the
statute of limitations run against him, then the cause of

-9-
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action is lost for the entire class.

This position is sup-

ported by the case of Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Sanders, 5
562 (Ky. 1887).

s.w.

In the Sanders case, the minors of a decedent

were estopped from bringing suit for wrongful death due to the
fact that the statute of limitations had run against a member
of the class entitled to sue.

As in Utah, the Kentucky

wrongful death statute provided for one cause of action only.
That cause of action accrued to anyone of three persons:

the

widow, heirs of the decedent, or the personal representative
of the decedent's estate.

The Sanders court observed that:

If there be one of these in being, with
the right to sue, then does not the policy
of the law and the comparison and consideration of all the statutory provisions upon
the subject dictate that the action must
be brought within the year from the
accrual of such right, to avoid a bar as
to all?
Sanders, supra, at 564.
Since neither the Utah wrongful death statute nor the
statute of limitations applicable to that statute speak to
this issue, the Court must look elsewhere for guidance.

The

Appellants cite numerous cases, including the recent decision
of this Court in Scott v. School Board of Granite School
District, 560 P.2d 746 (Utah 1977).

However, in each case

cited by the Appellants, an important element is missing.

Not

one of those cases contain the situation where one cause of
action existed for a class of people and the statute of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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limitations had run against a member of that class.

In each

case, only one person was entitled to sue on the cause of
action.

In the present matter, we have a class composed of

the widow of the deceased and five children.

There can be no

doubt that the statute of limitations ran as against the
widow, Louella R. Switzer Bowles, since she was under no
disability for the two years immediately subsequent to
the accrual of the cause of action.

That she was entitled to

bring the action as the survivor of the deceased is set forth
in Section 78-11-7, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended),
which provides, in pertinent part:
When the death of a person not a minor is
caused by the wrongful action or neglect
of another, his heirs, or his personal
representatives for the benefit of his
heirs, may maintain an action for damages
against the person causing the death • • •
Persuasive authority which would bring about the policy
set forth in the Sanders case, if controlling in this case,
is found in the Utah Products Liability Act, Section 78-15-3,
Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) which provides, in its
entirety:
(1) No action shall be brought for the recovery
of damages for personal injury, death or damage
to property more than six years after the date
of initial purchase for use or consumption or
ten years after the date of manufacture, of a
product, where the action is based upon, or
arises out of any of the following:

-11- provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(a)

Breach of implied warranty;

(b) Defects in design, inspection,
testing or manufacture;
(c)

Failure to warn;

(d) Failure to properly instruct in
the use of a product; or
(e) Any other alleged defect or
failure of whatsoever kind or nature
in relation to a product.
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply
to all eersons, regardless of minority or other
legal disability, but shall not apply to any
cause of action where the personal injury,
death or damage to property occurs within two
years after the effective date of this Act.
The purpose of this provision of the Utah Products Liability
Act is to prevent suit such as the one presently before this
Court.

The Legislature has made a policy decision that it is

unfair to require manufacturers to defend products liability
actions filed a substantial number of years after the date the
product was either manufactured or sold.

This unfairness is

evident in the present lawsuit in that both Respondents are
required to defend allegations of negligence, breach of
warranty, and strict liability arising out of an accident that
occurred 15 years ago and relating to a machine manufactured
22 years ago.

This unfairness is emphasized by the fact that

Louella R. Switzer Bowles could have filed this action at
time after June 24, 1963.
bring this action.

a~

Instead, she waited 11 years to

If this Court applies the interpretation
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propounded by the Appellants to the Wrongful Death Act and
statute of limitations, the statute of limitations would not
run on this action until May 23, 1983, which date would be two
years and one day after the youngest of the Appellants,
Therease Jo Switzer, born May 22, 1963, obtained her majority.
This would be one month and two days short of being twenty
years from the date of the accident and twenty-seven years and
three months from the date of sale of the 175A tractor by
Clark.

To require a manufacturer, or any party, to defend an

action at the expiration of such a substantial period of time
is more than unfair:

it approaches a violation of the due

process and equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This Court should consider the conclusion reached by
the court in Sanders:
When the administrator qualified, there was a
person in esse who had the right to sue for
and recover and receive entire damages,
leaving no longer in existence a cause of
action. The statute then began to run, not
only against him, but against the cause of
action. The statutory saving on behalf of
the infant is only intended to apply when
there is no one in being who has the power to
sue. Unless this construction be given to
it, the Statute of Limitations is not one of
repose, as the cause of action may be kept
alive for over twenty years, although there
is one in being during the entire time who
has the right to sue.
Sanders, supra, at 565 (emphasis added).
CONCLUSION
The Respondent submits that when considering the interest
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of all parties and the policy adopted by the Utah Legislature
in the Utah Products Liability Act, this Court should hold
that the statute of limitations ran against the Appellants'
cause of action when Louella R. Switze Bowles failed to
institute suit on the wrongful death action prior to June 24,
1965.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT IS VESTED WITH THE DISCRETIONARY
POWER TO PLACE, AS A CONDITION OF THE TAKING OF A
DEPOSITION, THAT THE PARTY NOTICING THE DEPOSITION
PAY THE OPPOSING PARTY'S COSTS OF ATTENDING THE
DEPOSITION.
A.

Conditions Placed upon Discovery.

Under the Amended

Protective Order dated June 29, 1977, the trial court ordered,
inter alia, that the Appellants, as a condition placed upon
the taking of the depositions of Walter L. Black and M. L.
Conrad, pay to Clark, the costs incurred by its counsel in
attending the depositions in Benton Harbor, Michigan.

These

costs would include attorney's fees at the rate of $70.00 per
hour.

The Order further provided that all costs incurred in

the inspection of the Respondent's microfilm records at Benton
Barbor were to be borne by the Appellants.
Rule 26(c), Otah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides the
trial court with the authority to make an order limiting
discovery, such as the Order outlined above.

That rule

provides, in pertinent part, that:
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Upon motion by a party or by the person
from whom discovery is sought, and for
good cause shown, the Court in which the
action is pending • • • may make any order
which justice requires to protect a party
or persons from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense,
including one or more of the following:
(2) that the discovery may be had only on
specified terms and conditions, including
a designation of the time or place • • •
Rule 26(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
It is well recognized in jurisdictions following the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, from which Rule 26(c) was
adopted, that the trial court, in making a protective order
under Rule 26(c), is vested with wide discretion.

See Banta

v. Superior Court, 112 Ariz. 544, 544 P.2d 653, 654 (1976);
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. City of Wichita, 217 Kan. 44, 536
P.2d 54, 64 (1975). The Appellants argue that the trial court
abused this discretion since, in their opinion, the order
effectively denied them discovery of microfilm records maintained by the Respondent Clark in Benton Harbor.
~

at 22.

See Appellants'

Due to the fact that the Appellants are unwill-

ing to pay the costs which would be incurred in retrieving and
reviewing the microfilm records, .it would apear that the Order
does prevent discovery of those records.

However, the deci-

sion of whether or not to pay for the retrieval and review is
that of the Appellants.
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The Appellants cannot argue, successfully, that a trial
judge cannot order a party seeking an out of state deposition
to pay the travel costs and attorney's fees incurred by the
opposing party.

See Gibson v. Inter'l Freighting Corp., 173

F.2d 591 (3rd Cir.) cert. den. 338 U.S. 832 reh. den. 338

u.s.

882 (1949); North Atlantic & Gulf S.S. Co. v. United States,
209 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1954).

In the Gibson case, the District

Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, held that a
party wishing to take an out of state deposition of a witness
for use at trial would be required to pay the costs incurred
by the opposing party in attending that deposition.

Those

costs would include the attorney's fees incurred by the
opposing party.

See Gibson, supra; see also Annot. 70

A.L.R.

2d 685, 758-64 (1960); see generally Moore v. George A.
~'

Hor~l

4 F.R.D. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); 4 Moore's Federal Practice,

Paragraph 26.77 (1976).
In the present matter, the trial court was confronted
with a situation wherein the Appellants wished to depose
two expert witnesses employed by the Respondant Clark and
residing in Benton Harbor, Michigan.

These depositions were

entirely for the benefit of the Appellants and not sought by
the Respondant Clark.

In this respect, the present case is

identical to the Gibson case, cited above.

In addition to the

fact that the depositions were solely beneficial to the
Appellants, the court was advised of the fact that the Appell·
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ants had submitted Interrogatories and Request for Production
upon the Respondant Clark, totaling 1845 individual questions
with an additional 497 requested documents.

In response to

these Interrogatories and Requests for Production, the Respondant Clark supplied, to the best of its ability, all of the
information requested.
In spite of the vast discovery previously completed by
them, the Appellants sought to discover microfilm records
which, in their own words, would take:
of time, perhaps a week or more •
22.

"A considerable period
"

Appellants' Brief at

The Respondent Clark was not required, as the Appellants

suggested, to undertake the retrieval and review of the
microfilm records at its own expense.

See Celanese Corp. V. E.

I. duPont deNemours & Co., 16 F.R. Serv. 2d 1531 {D. Del.
1973) {parties seeking broad discovery of documents were
ordered to bear costs of producing them.)
When viewed in light of the past discovery undertaken by
the Appellants and the burden and expense that would have been
placed upon the Respondent Clark if Clark were required to
pay the cost of its counsel attending the depositions and
reviewing the microfilm records and, further, the costs of
retrieving the microfilm records, the court properly decided
that if such discovery was to be undertaken by the Appellants,
that justice required that the Appellants pay for such discovery.
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B.

Appellants' Requests for Costs and Attorney's Fees on

Motion to Compel Discovery.
The Appellants' final argument under this point is that
this Court should award them the attorney's fees and costs
they incurred in various motions wherein they undertook to
compel the Respondent Clark to respond to certain discovery.
The Appellants freely admit in their Brief that they

request~

that these costs be awarded and, as of this time, the trial
court has yet to rule on these requests.
Brief at 23.

See Appellants'

A primary rule of appellate practice is that the

appellate court will not review a matter pending before a
lower court until the lower court has entered a final order or
judgment.

See Rule 72(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The

lower court has not decided the Appellants' request for costs
and attorney's fees, made concurrent with their Motion to
Compel and, therefore, this question is not properly before
this Court.
C.

Conclusion ••
The trial court acted properly and within the bounds of

its discretion when ordering the Appellants to pay the costs
to be incurred by the Respondent Clark in having its counsel
attend out of state depositions and, further, the costs to

be

incurred in retrieving and reviewing the micro-film records.
CONCLUSION TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
The Appellants challenge the lower courts decision on two
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grounds.

The first being that summary judgment was not

proper due to the fact that a genuine issue of fact existed
under their theories of negligence and for breach of warranty.
The Appellants failed to properly set forth any facts which
would have supported those theories.

The only facts before

the lower court indicated no negligence nor a breach of
warranty.

For this reason the Appellants appeal must fail.

Secondly, the Appellants contend that the statute of
limitations does not bar their action.
authority directly on point.

There is no Utah

However, the policy which should

be applied in determining this issue can be found in the Utah
Products Liability Act.

If the legislative policy announced

in that act is applied in this instance, the Appellants' cause
of action must fail.
The Respondent Clark respectfully submits that the
judgment and orders of the lower court be sustained.
Respectfully Submitted,
Attorneys for Respondent
Clark Equipment Company

Mailed two copies each
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